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Abstract
The increasing use of Machine Learning (ML) components embedded in autonomous systems – so-called Learning-
Enabled Systems (LES) – has resulted in the pressing need to assure their functional safety. As for traditional func-
tional safety, the emerging consensus within both, industry and academia, is to use assurance cases for this purpose.
Typically assurance cases support claims of reliability in support of safety, and can be viewed as a structured way
of organising arguments and evidence generated from safety analysis and reliability modelling activities. While such
assurance activities are traditionally guided by consensus-based standards developed from vast engineering experi-
ence, LES pose new challenges in safety-critical application due to the characteristics and design of ML models. In
this article, we first present an overall assurance framework for LES with an emphasis on quantitative aspects, e.g.,
breaking down system-level safety targets to component-level requirements and supporting claims stated in reliabil-
ity metrics. We then introduce a novel model-agnostic Reliability Assessment Model (RAM) for ML classifiers that
utilises the operational profile and robustness verification evidence. We discuss the model assumptions and the in-
herent challenges of assessing ML reliability uncovered by our RAM and propose practical solutions. Probabilistic
safety arguments at the lower ML component-level are also developed based on the RAM. Finally, to evaluate and
demonstrate our methods, we not only conduct experiments on synthetic/benchmark datasets but also demonstrate the
scope of our methods with a comprehensive case study on Autonomous Underwater Vehicles in simulation.
Keywords: Software reliability, safety arguments, assurance cases, safe AI, robustness verification, safety-critical
systems, statistical testing, operational profile, probabilistic claims, robotics and autonomous systems, autonomous
underwater vehicles, safety regulation, software certification, dependable computing.
1. Introduction
Industry is increasingly adopting AI/Machine Learning (ML) algorithms to enhance the operational performance,
dependability, and lifespan of products and service – systems with embedded ML-based software components. For
such Learning-Enabled Systems (LES), in safety-related applications high reliability is essential to ensure successful
operations and regulatory compliance. For instance, several fatalities were caused by the failures of LES built in Uber
and Tesla’s cars. IBM’s Watson, the decision-making engine behind the Jeopardy AI success, has been deemed a
costly and potentially deadly failure when extended to medical applications like cancer diagnosis. Key industrial fore-
sight reviews have identified that the biggest obstacle to reap the benefits of ML-powered Robotics and Autonomous
Systems (RAS) is the assurance and regulation of their safety and reliability [42]. Thus, there is an urgent need to
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develop methods that enable the dependable use of AI/ML in critical applications and, just as importantly, to assess
and demonstrate the dependability for certification and regulation.
For traditional systems, safety regulation is guided by well-established standards/policies, and supported by mature
development processes and Verification and Validation (V&V) tools/techniques. The situation is different for LES:
they are disruptively novel and often treated as a black box with the lack of validated standards/policies [16], while
they require new and advanced analysis for the complex requirements in their safe and reliable function. Such analysis
needs to be tailored to fully evaluate the new character of ML [1, 19, 41], despite some progress made recently
[32]. This reinforces the need for not only an overall methodology/framework in assuring the whole LES, but also
innovations in safety analysis and reliability modelling for ML components, which motivate our work.
In this article, we first propose an overall assurance framework for LES, presented in Claims-Arguments-Evidence
(CAE) assurance cases [14]. While inspired by [15], ours is with greater emphasis on arguing for quantitative safety
requirements. This is because the unique characteristics of ML increase apparent non-determinism [36] that explicitly
requires probabilistic claims to capture the uncertainties in its assurance [69, 3, 18]. To demonstrate the overall
assurance framework as an end-to-end methodology, we also consider important questions on how to derive and
validate (quantitative) safety requirements and how to break them down to functionalities of ML components for a
given LES. Indeed, there should not be any generic, definitive, or fixed answers to those hard questions for now,
since AI/ML is an emerging technology that is still heavily in flux. That said, we propose a promising solution
that we believe is the most practical for the moment: we exercise the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) (a
systematic hazards identification method) [63], quantitative Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) (a common probabilistic root-
cause analysis) [43], and leverage existing regulation principles to validate the acceptable and tolerable safety risk,
e.g., Globally At Least Equivalent (GALE) to non-AI/ML systems or human performance.
Upon establishing safety/reliability requirements on low-level functionalities of ML components, we build ded-
icated Reliability Assessment Models (RAM). In this article, we mainly focus on assessing the reliability of the
classification function of the ML component, extending our initial RAM in [71] with more practical considerations
for scalability. Our RAM explicitly takes the Operational Profile (OP) information and robustness evidence into
account, because—(i) Reliability, as a user-centred property, depends on the end-users’ behaviours [46], and the OP
(quantifying how the software will be operated ML classifiers are subject to robustness concerns[51]) should therefore
be explicitly modelled in the assessment; (ii) a RAM without considering robustness evidence is not convincing. To
the best of our knowledge, our RAM is the first to consider both, the OP and robustness evidence. It is inspired by
partition-based testing [28, 53], operational/statistical testing [61, 75] and ML robustness evaluation [21, 66]. Our
RAM is model-agnostic and designed for pre-trained ML models, yielding estimates of, e.g., expected values or
confidence bounds on the probability of misclassification per random input (pmi)1.
Then, we present a set of safety case templates to support reliability claims2 stated in pmi based on our new
RAM—the “backbone” of the probabilistic safety arguments for ML components. Essentially, the key argument is
over the rigour of the four main steps of the RAM: all perspectives of the RAM, including modelling assumptions,
hyper-parameter selections, intermediate calculations and final testing results, should be presented, justified and or-
ganised in a structured way.
Finally, a comprehensive case study based on a simulated Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) that carries
out survey and asset inspection missions is conducted. The case study in our simulator is both efficient and effective
as a first step to demonstrate and validate our methods which, we believe, can be easily transferred to real-world case
studies. All simulators, ML models, datasets and experimental results used in this work are publicly available at the
our project repository https://github.com/Solitude-SAMR with a video demo at https://youtu.be/akY8f5sSFpY.
Summary of Contributions. The key contributions of this work include:
• An assurance case framework for LES that: (i) emphasises the arguments for quantitative claims on safety and
reliability; (ii) with an “end-to-end” chain of safety analysis and reliability modelling methods for arguments
ranging from the very top safety claim of the whole LES to low-level V&V evidence of ML components.
1This reliability measure is similar to the conventional probability of failure on demand (pfd), but retrofitted for classifiers.
2We deal with probabilistic claims in this part, so “reliability” claims are about probabilities of occurrence of failures, and “safety” claims
are about failures that are safety-relevant. The two kinds do not require different statistical reasoning, thus we may use the two terms safety and
reliability interchangeably when referring to the probabilities of safety-relevant failures.
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• A first RAM evaluating reliability for ML software, leveraging both the OP information and robustness evi-
dence. Moreover, based on the RAM, templates of probabilistic arguments for reliability claims on ML software
are developed.
• Identification of open challenges in building safety arguments for LES and highlighting the inherent difficulties
of assessing ML reliability, uncovered by our overall assurance framework and the proposed RAM, respectively.
Potential solutions are discussed and mapped onto on-going studies to advance in this research direction.
• A prototype tool of our RAM and a simulator platform of AUV for underwater missions that are reusable and
extendable as a starting point for future research.
Organisation of this Article. After presenting preliminaries in Section 2, we outline our overall assurance framework
in Section 3. After that, the RAM is described in details with a running example in Section 4, following by its
probabilistic safety arguments for ML classification reliability in Section 5. We then present our case study on AUV
in Section 6. Related work is summarised in Section 7, while in-depth discussions are provided in Section 8. Finally,
we conclude in Section 9 and outline plans for future work.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Assurance Cases, CAE Notations and CAE Blocks
Assurance cases are developed to support claims in areas such as safety, reliability and security. They are often
called by more specific names like security cases [40] and safety cases [11]. A safety case is a compelling, comprehen-
sive, defensible, and valid justification of the system safety for a given application in a defined operating environment;
it is therefore a means to provide the grounds for confidence and to assist decision making in certification [14]. For
decades, safety cases have been widely used in the European safety community to assure system safety. Moreover,
they are mandatory in the regulation for systems used in safety-critical industries in some countries, e.g., in the UK
for nuclear energy [64]. Early research in safety cases has mainly focused on their formulation in terms of claims,
arguments, and evidence elements based on fundamental argumentation theories like the Toulmin model [58]. The
two most popular notations are CAE [14] and GSN [38]. In this article, we choose the former to present our assurance
case templates.
A summary of the CAE notations is provided in Figure 1. The CAE safety case starts with a top claim, which is
then supported through an argument by sub-claims. Sub-claims can be further decomposed until being supported by
evidence. A claim may be subject to some context, represented by general purpose other nodes, while assumptions
(or warranties) of arguments that need to be explicitly justified form new side-claims. A sub-case repeats a claim
presented in another argument module. Notably, the basic concepts of CAE are supported by safety standards like
ISO/IEC15026-2. Readers are referred to [18, 15] for more details on all CAE elements.
The CAE framework additionally consists of CAE blocks that provide five common argument fragments and a
mechanism for separating inductive and deductive aspects of the argumentation3. These were identified by empirical
analysis of real-world safety cases [17]. The five CAE blocks representing the restrictive set of arguments are:
• Decomposition: partition some aspect of the claim—“divide and conquer”.
• Substitution: transform a claim about an object into a claim about an equivalent object.
• Evidence Incorporation: evidence supports the claim, with emphasis on direct support.
• Concretion: some aspect of the claim is given a more precise definition.
• Calculation (or Proof): some value of the claim can be computed or proven.
An illustrative use of CAE blocks is shown in Figure 1, while more detailed descriptions can be found in [17, 15].
3The argument strategy can be either inductive or deductive [1]. For an inductive strategy, additional analysis is required to ensure that residual
risks are mitigated.
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Figure 1: Summary of the CAE notations (lhs) and an example of CAE block use (rhs), cited from [15].
2.2. HAZOP and FTA
HAZOP is a structured and systematic safety analysis technique for risk management, which is used to identify
potential hazards for the system in the given operating environment. HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk
events are caused by deviations from design or operating intentions. Identification of such deviations is facilitated
by using sets of “guide words” (e.g., too much, too little and no) as a systematic list of deviation perspectives. It is
commonly performed by a multidisciplinary team of experts during brainstorming sessions. HAZOP is a technique
originally developed and used in chemical industries. There are studies that successfully apply it to software-based
systems [63]. Readers will see an illustrative example in later sections, while we refer to [23] for more details.
FTA is a quantitative safety analysis technique on how failures propagate through the system, i.e., how component
failures lead to system failures. The fundamental concept in FTA is the distillation of system component faults that
can lead to a top-level event into a structured diagram (fault tree) using logic gates (e.g., AND, OR, Exclusive-OR
and Priority-AND). We show a concrete example of FTA in our case study section, while a full tutorial of developing
FTA is out of the scope of this article, and readers are referred to [57] for more details.
2.3. OP Based Software Reliability Assessment
The delivered reliability, as a user-centred and probabilistic property, requires to model the end-users’ behaviours
(in the operating environments) and to be formally defined by a quantitative metric [46]. Without loss of generality,
we focus on pmi as a generic metric for ML classifiers, where inputs can, e.g., be images acquired by a robot for
object recognition.




I{x causes a misclassification}(x)Op(x) dx , (1)
where x is an input in the input domain4 X , and IS(x) is an indicator function—it is equal to 1 when S is true and
equal to 0 otherwise. The function Op(x) returns the probability that x is the next random input.
4We assume continuousX in this article. For discreteX , the integral in Eqn. (1) reduces to sum and Op(·) becomes a probability mass function.
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Remark 1 (OP). The OP [51] is a notion used in software engineering to quantify how the software will be operated.
Mathematically, the OP is a Probability Density Function (PDF) defined over the whole input domain X .
We highlight this Remark 1, because we will use probability density estimators to approximate the OP from the
collected operational dataset in the RAM we develop in Section 4.
By the definition of pmi, successive inputs are assumed to be independent. It is therefore common to use a
Bernoulli process as the mathematical abstraction of the failure process, which implies a Binomial likelihood. When
used for traditional software that, upon establishing the likelihood, RAMs on estimating λ vary case by case—from the
basic Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to Bayesian estimators tailored for certain scenarios when, e.g., seeing
no failures [50, 12], inferring ultra-high reliability [75], with certain forms of prior knowledge like perfectioness [62],
with vague prior knowledge expressed in imprecise probabilities [65, 73], with uncertain OPs [13, 53], etc.
OP based RAMs designed for traditional software fail to consider new characteristics of ML, e.g., a potential lack
of robustness and a high-dimensional input space. Specifically, it is quite hard to gather the required prior knowledge
when taking into account the new ML characteristics in those Bayesian RAMs. At the same time, frequentist RAMs
would require a large sample size to gain enough confidence in the estimates due to the extremely large population
size (e.g., the high-dimensional pixel space for images). As an example, the usual accuracy testing of ML classifiers
is essentially an MLE estimate against the test set, which has the following problems: (i) it assumes the test set
statistically represents the OP, which is rarely the case; (ii) the test set is a very small fraction of the whole input space,
thus limited confidence can be claimed in reliability; and (iii) without explicitly considering robustness evidence, the
reliability claim for ML is not trustworthy.
2.4. ML Robustness and the R-Separation Property
ML is known not to be robust. Robustness requires that the decision of the ML modelM is invariant against small
perturbations on inputs. That is, all inputs in a region η ⊂ X have the same prediction label, where usually the region
η is a small norm ball (in an Lp-norm distance5) of radius ε around an input x. Inside η, if an input x′ is classified
differently to x byM, then x′ is an Adversarial Example (AE). Robustness can be defined either as a binary metric (if
there exists any AE in η) or as a probabilistic metric (how likely the event of seeing an AE in η is). The former aligns
with formal verification, e.g. [33], while the latter is normally used in statistical approaches, e.g. [66]. The former
“verification approach” is the binary version of the latter “stochastic approach”6.
Definition 2 (robustness). Similar to [66], we adopt the more general probabilistic definition on the robustness of the




I{M(x) predicts label y}(x)Op(x | x ∈ η) dx , (2)
where Op(x | x ∈ η) is the conditional OP of region η (precisely the “input model” used by both [66] and [67]).
We highlight the follow two remarks regarding robustness:
Remark 2 (astuteness). Reliability assessment only concerns the robustness to the ground truth label, rather than an
arbitrary label y in RM(η, y). When y is such a ground truth, robustness becomes astuteness [68], which is also the
conditional reliability in the region η.
Astuteness is a special case of robustness7. An extreme example showing why we introduce the concept of astuteness
is, that a perfectly robust classifier that always outputs “dog” for any given input is unreliable. Thus, robustness
evidence cannot directly support reliability claims unless the ground truth label is used in estimating RM(η, y).
Remark 3 (r-separation). For real-world image datasets, any data-points with different ground truth are at least
distance 2r apart in the input space (pixel space), and r is bigger than a norm ball radius commonly used in robustness
studies.
5Distance mentioned in this article is defined in L∞ if without further clarification.
6Thus, we use the more general term robustness “evaluation” rather than robustness “verification” throughout the article.
7Thus, later in this article, we may refer to robustness as astuteness for brevity when it is clear from the context.
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The r-separation property was first observed by [68]: real-world image datasets studied by the authors implies that
r is normally 3 ∼ 7 times bigger than the radius (denoted as ε) of norm balls commonly used in robustness studies.
Intuitively it says that, although the classification boundary is highly non-linear, there is a minimal distance between
two real-world objects of different classes (cf. Figure 2 for a conceptual illustration). Moreover, such a minimal
distance is bigger than the usual norm ball size in robustness studies.
Figure 2: Illustration of the r-separation property.
3. The Overall Assurance Framework
In this section, we present an overall assurance framework for LES (e.g., AUV). The assurance framework is
presented as a CAE assurance case template [14], in which we highlight both the main focus of this work—a RAM
for the ML component with its probabilistic safety arguments—and all its required supporting analysis to derive the
reliability requirements on the low-level ML functionalities.
3.1. Overview of an Assurance Case for LES
To argue for TLSC1, we refer to the template proposed by [15, Chap. 5] as our sub-case SubC1. Essentially,
in SubC1, we argue R is: (i) well-defined (e.g., verifiable, consistent, unambiguous, traceable, etc); (ii) complete
that covers all sources (e.g., from hazard analysis and domain-specific safety standards/legislation); and (iii) valid,
according to some common risk acceptance criteria/principles in safety regulations of different countries/domains,
e.g., ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable). Without repeating the content of [15], we only highlight the
parts directly supporting the main focus of this work (via the procedure in Figure 4), which are hazard identification
(SubC2) and derivation of quantitative safety target (SubC3).
Similar to [15], we use a decomposition CAE-block/argument to support TLC2. But, in addition to time-split, we
also split the claim by the qualitative and quantitative nature, since the main focus of this work, SubC7, concerns the
probabilistic reliability modelling of ML components. Further decomposition of the whole system’s quantitative re-
quirements into functionalities of individual components (TCL3) is non-trivial, for which we utilise quantitative FTA.
The decomposition requires a side-claim on the sufficiency of the FTA study TLSC2. A comprehensive development
SubC8 for TLSC2 is out of the scope of this work, while we illustrate the gist and an example of the method in later
sections. Finally, we reach the main focus of this work SubC7 and will develop the full sub-case for it in Section 5.
3.2. Deriving Quantitative Requirements for ML Components
As mentioned, in this work we are mainly developing low-level probabilistic safety arguments, based on the dedi-
cated RAM for ML components developed in Section 4. An inevitable question is how to quantitatively determine the
tolerable and acceptable risk levels of the ML components. Normally the answer involves a series of well-established
safety analysis methods that systematically breaks down the whole-system level risk to low-level components, consid-
ering the system architecture [45, 69]. While, the whole-system level risk is determined on a case by case basis through
the application of principles and criteria required by the safety regulations extant in the different countries/domains.
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Figure 3: Overview of the proposed safety case template for LES, highlighting the main focus and supporting content of the work.
Figure 4: The workflow of combining HAZOP and quantitative FTA to derive probabilities of basic-events of components.
To align with this best practice, we propose the procedure articulated in Figure 4, whose major steps correspond to
the supporting sub-cases SubC2, SubC3 and SubC8.
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In Figure 4, for the given LES, we first identify a set of safety properties that are desirable to stakeholders. Then,
a HAZOP analysis is conducted, based on deviations of those properties, to systematically identify hazards (and their
causes, consequences, and mitigations). New safety properties may be introduced by the mitigations identified by
HAZOP, thus HAZOP is conducted in an iterative manner that forms the first loop in Figure 4.
Then, we leverage the HAZOP results to do hazard scenario modelling, inspired by [27], so that we may combine
HAZOP and FTA later on. Usually, as also noted in [27], a property deviation can have several causes and different
consequences in HAZOP analysis. It is complicated and difficult to directly convert HAZOP results into fault trees.
Thus, hazard scenario modelling is needed to explicitly link the initial events (causes) to the final events (conse-
quences) with a chain of intermediate events. Such event-chains facilitate the construction of fault trees, specifically
in three steps:
• The initial events (causes) may or may not be further decomposed at even lower-level sub-functionalities of
components to determine the root causes, which are used as basic events (BE) in FTA. Thus, BEs are typically
failure events of software/hardware components, e.g., different types of misclassifications, failures in different
modes of a propeller.
• Adding a specific logic gate among all intermediate events (IE) on the same level, which models how failures
are propagated, tolerated and/or compounded throughout the system architecture.
• Final events (consequences) are used as top events (TE) of the FTA. In other words, TEs are violations of
system-level safety properties.
Upon establishing the fault trees, conventional quantitative FTA can be performed to propagate probabilities of
BEs to the TE probability, or, reversely, to allocate/break-down TE probability to BEs. What-if calculations and
sensitivity analysis are expected to find the most practical solution of BE probabilities that makes the required TE risk
tolerable. Then the practical solution for the BE associated with the ML component of our interest becomes our target
reliability claims for which we develop probabilistic safety arguments. Notably, the ML component may need several
rounds of retraining/fine-tuning to achieve the required level of reliability. This forms part8 of the second iterative
loop in Figure 4. We refer readers to [72] for a more detailed description on this debug-retrain-assess loop for ML
software.
Finally, the problem boils down to (i) how to derive the system-level quantitative safety target, i.e., assigning
probabilities for those TEs of the fault trees; and (ii) how to demonstrate the component-level reliability is satisfied,
i.e., assessing the BE probabilities for components based on evidence. We address the second question in the next
section, while the first question is essentially “how safe is safe enough?”, for which the general answer depends on
the existing regulation/certification principles/standards of different countries and industry domains. Unfortunately,
existing safety standards cannot be applied on LES, and revisions are still ongoing. Therefore, we currently do not
have a commonly acknowledged practice that can be easily applied to certify or regulate LES [16, 39]. That said,
emerging studies on assuring/assessing the safety and reliability of AI and autonomous systems have borrowed ideas
from existing regulation principles on risk acceptability and tolerability, e.g.,:
• ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable): ALARP states that the residual risk after the application of
safety measures should be as low as reasonably practicable. The notion of being reasonably practicable relates
to the cost and level of effort to reduce risk further. It originally arises from UK legislation and is now applied
in many domains like nuclear energy.
• GALE (Globally At Least Equivalent): is a principle required by French law for railway safety, which indicates
the new technical system shall be at least as safe as comparable existing ones.
• SE (Substantially Equivalent): similar to GALE; new medical devices in the US must be demonstrated to
be substantially equivalent to a device already on the market. This is required by the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration (FDA).
8Other non-ML components may be updated as well to jointly make the whole-system risk tolerable.
8
• MEM (Minimum Endogenous Mortality): MEM states that a new system should not lead to a significant in-
crease in the risk exposure for a population with the lowest endogenous mortality. For instance, the rate of
natural deaths is a reference point for acceptability.
While a complete list of all principles and comparisons between them are beyond the scope of this work, we believe
that the common trend is that, for many LES, a promising way of determining the system-level quantitative safety
target is to argue the acceptable/tolerable risk over the average human-performance. For instance, self-driving cars’
targets of being as safe as or two-magnitude safer than human-drivers (in terms of metrics like fatalities per mile)
are studied in [37, 75, 47]. In [52], human-doctors’ performance is used as the benchmark in arguing the safety of
ML-based medical diagnosis systems.
In summary, we are only presenting the essential steps of combining HAZOP and quantitative FTA via hazard
scenario modelling to derive component-level reliability requirements from whole system-level safety targets, while
each of those steps with concrete examples can be found in Section 6 as part of the AUV case study.
4. Modelling the Reliability of ML Classifiers
4.1. A Running Example of a Synthetic Dataset
To better demonstrate our RAM, we take the Challenge of AI Dependability Assessment raised by Siemens Mo-
bility9 as a running example. The challenge is to firstly train an ML model to classify a dataset generated on the
unit square [0, 1]2 according to some unknown distribution (essentially the unknown OP). The collected data-points
(training set) are shown in Fig. 5-lhs, in which each point is a tuple of two numbers between 0 and 1 (thus called a
“2D-point”). We then need to build a RAM to claim an upper bound on the probability that the next random point
is misclassified, i.e., the pmi. If the 2D-points represent traffic lights, then we have 2 types of misclassifications—
safety-critical ones, when a red data-point is labelled green, and performance related ones otherwise. For brevity, we
only focus on misclassifications here, while our RAM can cope with sub-types of misclassifications.
Figure 5: The 2D-point dataset (lhs), and its approximated OP (rhs).
4.2. The Proposed RAM
Principles and Main Steps of the RAM. Inspired by [53], our RAM first partitions the input domain into m small
cells10, subject to the r-separation property. Then, for each cell ci (and its ground truth label yi), we estimate:
λi := 1−RM(ci, yi) and Opi :=
∫
x∈ci
Op(x) dx , (3)
9https://ecosystem.siemens.com/topic/detail/default/33
10We use the term “cell” to highlight the partition that yields exhaustive and mutually exclusive regions of the input space, which is essentially a
norm ball in L∞. Thus, we use the terms “cell” and “norm ball” interchangeably in this article when the emphasis is clear from the context.
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which are the unastuteness and pooled OP of the cell ci respectively—we introduce estimators for both later. Eqn. (1)
can then be written as the weighted sum of the cell-wise unastuteness (i.e., the conditional pmi of each cell11), where





Eqn. (4) captures the essence of our RAM—it shows clearly how we incorporate the OP information and the
robustness evidence to claim reliability. This reduces the problem is reduced to: (i) how to obtain the estimates
on those λis and Opis and (ii) how to measure and propagate the trust in the estimates. These two questions are
challenging. To name a few of the challenges for the first question: estimating λi requires to determine the ground
truth label of cell i; and estimating Opis may require a large amount of operational data. For the second question, the
fact that all estimators are imperfect entails that they need a measure of trust (e.g., the variance of a point estimate),
which may not be easy to derive.
In what follows, by referring to the running example, we proceed in four main steps: (i) partition the input space
into cells; (ii) approximate the OP of cells (the Opis); (iii) evaluate the unastuteness of these cells (the λis); and (iv)
“assemble” all cell-wise estimates for λ in a way that is informed by the uncertainty.
Step 1: Partition of the Input DomainX . As per Remark 2, the astuteness evaluation of a cell requires its ground truth
label. To leverage the r-separation property and Assumption 3, we partition the input space by choosing a cell radius
ε so that ε < r. Although we concur with Remark 3 (first observed by [68]) and believe that there should exist an
r-stable ground truth (which means that the ground truth is stable in such a cell) for any real-world ML classification
applications, it is hard to estimate such an r (denoted by r̂) and the best we can do is to assume:
Assumption 1. There is a r-stable ground truth (as a corollary of Remark 3) for any real-world classification prob-
lems, and the r parameter can be sufficiently estimated from the existing dataset.
That said, in the running example, we get r̂ = 0.004013 by iteratively calculating the minimum distance of
different labels. Then we choose a cell radius12 ε, which is smaller than r̂—we choose ε = 0.004. With this value, we
partition the unit square X into 250× 250 cells.
Step 2: Cell OP Approximation. Given a dataset (X,Y ), we estimate the pooled OP of cell ci to get E[Opi] and
V[Opi]. We use the well-established Kernel Density Estimate (KDE) to fit a Ôp(x) to approximate the OP.
Assumption 2. The existing dataset (X,Y ) is randomly sampled from the OP, thus statistically represents the OP.
This assumption may not hold in practice: training data is normally collected in a balanced way, since the ML model
is expected to perform well in all categories of inputs, especially when the OP is unknown at the time of training
and/or expected to change in future. Although our model can easily relax this assumption (cf. Section 8), we adopt it
for brevity in demonstrating the running example.










where K is the kernel function (e.g. Gaussian or exponential kernels), and h > 0 is a smoothing parameter, called the
bandwidth, cf. [60] for guidelines on tuning h. The approximated OP13 is shown in Figure 5-rhs.
Since our cells are small and all equal size, instead of calculating
∫
x∈ci Ôp(x)dx, we may approximate Opi as
Ôpi = Ôp (xci) vc (6)
11We use “cell unastuteness” and “cell pmi” interchangeably later.
12We use the term “radius” for cell size defined in L∞, which happens to be the side length of the square cell of the 2D running example.
13In this case, the KDE uses a Gaussian kernel and h = 0.2 that optimised by cross-validated grid-search [8].
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where Ôp(xci) is the probability density at the cell’s central point xci , and vc is the constant cell volume (0.000016
in the running example).
Now if we introduce new variables Wj = 1hK(
x−Xj
h ), the KDE evaluated at x is actually the sample mean of
W1, . . . ,Wn. Then by invoking the Central Limiting Theorem (CLT), we have Ôp(x) ∼ N (µW , σ
2
W
n ), where the









) ≈ σ̂2B(x) , (7)
where the last step of Eqn. (7) says that V[Ôp(x)] can be approximated using a bootstrap variance σ̂2B(x) [22] (cf.
Appendix A for details).
Upon establishing Eqn.s (5) and (7), together with Eqn. (6), we know for a given cell ci (and its central point xci ):
E[Opi] = vcE[Ôp(xci)], V[Opi] = v2cV[Ôp(xci)] , (8)
which are the OP estimates of this cell.
Step 3: Cell Astuteness Evaluation. As a corollary of Remark 3 and Assumption 1, we may confidently assume:
Assumption 3. If the radius of ci is smaller than r, all data-points in the cell ci share a single ground truth label.
Now, to determine such ground truth label of a cell ci, we can classify our cells into three types:
• Normal cells: a normal cell contains data-points from the existing dataset. These data-points from a single cell
are sharing a same ground truth label, which is then determined as the ground truth label of the cell.
• Empty cells: a cell is “empty” in the sense that it contains no data-points from the existing dataset of observed
points. Some of the empty cells will eventually become non-empty as more future operational data being
collected, while most of them will remain empty forever: once cells are sufficiently small, only a small share of
cells will refer to physically plausible images, and even fewer are possible in a given application. For simplicity,
we do not further distinguish these two types of empty cells in this paper.
Due to the lack of data, it is hard to determine an empty cell’s ground truth. For now, we do voting based on
labels predicted (by the ML model) for random samples from the cell, making the following assumption.
Assumption 4. The accuracy of the ML model is better than a classifier doing random classifications in any
given cell.
This assumption essentially relates to the oracle problem of ML testing, for which we believe that recent efforts
(e.g. [25]) and future research may relax it.
• Cross-boundary cells: our estimate of r based on the existing dataset is normally imperfect, e.g. due to noise in
the dataset, and the size of the dataset is not large enough. Thus, we may still observe data-points with different
labels in a single cell (especially when new operational data with labels is collected). Such cells are crossing
the classification boundary. If our estimate on r is sufficiently accurate, they should be very rare. Without the
need to determine the ground truth label of a cross boundary cell, we simply and conservatively set the cell
unastuteness to 1.
So far, the problem is reduced to: given a normal or empty cell ci with the known ground truth label yi, evaluate
the misclassification probability upon a random input x ∈ ci, E[λi], and its variance V[λi]. This is essentially a
statistical problem that has been studied in [66] using Multilevel Splitting Sampling, while we use the Simple Monte








The CLT tells us λ̂i ∼ N (µ, σ
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n ) when n is large, where µ and σ
2 are the population mean and variance of


















(I{M(xj) 6=yi} − µ̂n)
2 (10)
Notably, to solve the above statistical problem with sampling methods, we need to assume how the inputs in the
cell are distributed, i.e., a distribution for the conditional OP Op(x | x ∈ ci). Without loss of generality, we assume:
Assumption 5. The inputs in a small region like a cell are uniformly distributed.
This assumption is not uncommon (e.g., it is made in [66, 67]) and can be easily replaced by other distributions,
provided there is supporting evidence for such a change.
Step 4: Assembling of the Cell-Wise Estimates. Eqn. (4) represents an ideal case in which we know those λis and
Opis with certainty. In practice, we can only estimate them with imperfect estimators yielding, e.g., a point estimate
with variance capturing the measure of trust14. To assemble the estimates of λis and Opis to get the estimates on λ,
and also to propagate the confidence in those estimates, we assume:
Assumption 6. All λis and Opis are independent unknown variables under estimations.














E[λi]2V[Opi] + E[Opi]2V[λi] + V[λi]V[Opi] . (12)
Note that, for the variance, the covariance terms are dropped due to the independence assumption.
Depending on the specific estimators adopted, certain parametric families of the distribution of λ can be assumed,
from which any quantile of interest (e.g., 95%) can be derived as our confidence bound in reliability. For the running
example, we might assume λ ∼ N (E[λ],V[λ]) as an approximation by invoking the (generalised) CLT15. Then, an
upper bound with 1− α confidence is
Ub1−α = E[λ] + z1−α
√
V[λ] , (13)
where Pr(Z ≤ z1−α) = 1− α, and Z ∼ N (0, 1) is a standard normal distribution.
4.3. Extension to High-Dimensional Dataset
In order to better convey the principles and main steps of our proposed RAM, we have demonstrated a “low-
dimensional” version of our RAM, which is tailored for the running example (a synthetic 2D-dataset). However, real-
world applications normally involve high-dimensional data like images, exposing the presented “low-dimensional”
RAM to scalability challenges. In this section, we investigate how to extend our RAM for high-dimensional data, and
take a few practical solutions to tackle the scalability issues raised by “the curse of dimensionality”.
14This aligns with the traditional idea of using FTA (and hence the assurance arguments around it) for future reliability assessment.
15Assuming λis and Opis are all normally and independently but not identically distributed, the product of two normal variables is approximately
normal while the sum of normal variables is exactly normal, thus the variable λ is also approximated as being normally distributed (especially when
the number of sum terms is large).
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Approximating the OP in the Latent Feature Space Instead of the Input Pixel Space. The number of cells yielded
by the previously discussed way of partitioning the input domain (pixel space) is exponential in the dimensionality
of data. Thus, it is hard to accurately approximate the OP due to the relatively sparse data collected: the number
of cells is usually significantly larger than the number of observations made. However, for real-world data (say an
image), what really determines the label is its features rather than the pixels. Thus, we envisage some latent space, e.g.
compressed by Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE), that captures only the feature-wise information; this latent space
can be explored for high-dimensional data. That is, instead of approximating the OP in the input pixel space, we (i)
first encode/project each collected data-point into the compressed latent space, reducing its dimensionality, (ii) then
fit a “latent space OP” with KDE based on the compressed dataset, and (iii) finally “map” data-points (paired with the
learnt OP) in the latent space back to the input space.
Remark 4 (mapping between feature and pixel spaces). Depending on which data compression technique we use and
how the “decoder” works, the “map” action may vary case by case. For the VAE adopted in our work, we decode
one point from the latent space as a “clean” image (with only feature-wise information), and then add perturbations
to generate a norm ball (with a size determined by the r-separation distance, cf. Remark 3) in the input pixel space.
Applying Efficient Multivariate KDE for Cell OP Approximation. We may encounter technical challenges when fitting
the PDF from high-dimensional datasets. There are two known major challenges when applying multivariate KDE
to high-dimensional data: i) the choice of bandwidth H represents the covariance matrix that mostly impacts the
estimation accuracy; and ii) scalability issues in terms of storing intermediate data structure (e.g., data-points in hash-
tables) and querying times made when estimating the density at a given input. For the first challenge, the optimal
calculation of the bandwidth matrix can refer to some rule of thumb [60, 59] and the cross-validation [8]. There is also
dedicated research on improving the efficiency of multivariate KDE, e.g., [5] presents a framework for multivariate
KDE in provably sub-linear query time with linear space and linear pre-processing time to the dimensions.
Applying Efficient Estimators for Cell Robustness. We have demonstrated the use of SMC to evaluate cell robustness
in our running example. It is known that SMC is not computationally efficient to estimate rare-events, such as AEs
in the high-dimensional space of a robust ML model. We therefore need more advanced and efficient sampling
approaches that are designed for rare-events to satisfy our need. We notice that the Adaptive Multi-level Splitting
method has been retrofitted in [66] to statistically estimate the model’s local robustness, which can be (and indeed has
been) applied in our later experiments for image datasets. In addition to statistical approaches, formal method based
verification techniques might also be applied to assess a cell’s pmi, e.g., [33]. They provide formal guarantees on
whether or not the ML model will misclassify any input inside a small region. Such “robust region” proved by formal
methods is normally smaller than our cells, in which case the λ̂i can be conservatively set as the proportion of the
robust region covered in cell ci (under Assumption 5).
Assembling a Limited Number of Cell-Wise Estimates with Informed Uncertainty. The number of cells yielded by
current way of partitioning the input domain is exponential to the dimensionality of data, thus it is impossible to
explore all cells for high-dimensional data as we did for the running example. We may have to limit the number of
cells under robustness evaluation due to the limited budget in practice. Consequently, in the final “assembling” step
of our RAM, we can only assemble a limited number of cells, say k, instead of all m cells. In this case, we refer to
the estimator designed for weighted average based on samples [10]. Specifically, we proceed as what follows:
• Based on the collected dataset with n data-points, the OP is approximated in a latent space, which is compressed
by VAE. Then we may obtain a set of n norm balls (paired with their OP) after mapping the compressed dataset
to the input space (cf. Remark 4) as the sample frame16.
• We define weight wi for each of the n norm balls according to their approximated OP, wi := E[Opi].
• Given a budget that we can only evaluate the robustness of k norm balls, k samples are randomly selected (with
replacement) and fed into the robustness estimator to get E[λi].
16While the population is the set of (non-overlapping) norm balls covering the whole input space, i.e. the m cells mentioned in the “lower-
dimensional” version of the RAM.
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Moreover, a confidence upper bound of interest can be derived from Eqn. (13).
Note that there is no variance terms of λi and Opi in Eqn.s (14) and (15), implying the following assumption:
Assumption 7. The uncertainty informed by Eqn. (15) is sourced from the sampling of k norm balls, which is assumed
to be the major source of uncertainty. This makes the uncertainties contributed by the robustness and OP estimators
(i.e. the variance terms of λi and Opi) negligible.
4.4. Evaluation on the Proposed RAM
In addition to the running example, we conduct experiments on two more synthetic 2D-datasets, as shown in
Figure 6. They represent scenarios with relatively sparse and dense training data, respectively. Moreover, to gain
insights on how to extend our RAM for high-dimensional datasets, we also conduct experiments on the popular
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Instead of implementing the steps in Section 4.2, we take solutions to tackle the
scalability issues raised by “the curse of dimensionality”, as articulated in Section 4.3. Finally, all modelling details
and results after applying our RAM on those datasets are summarised in Table 1, where we compare the testing error,
Average Cell Unastuteness (ACU) defined by Definition 3, and our RAM results (of the mean E[λ], variance V[λ] and
a 97.5% confidence upper bound Ub97.5%).
Definition 3 (ACU). Stemmed from the Definition 2 and Remark 2, the unastuteness λi of a region ci is consequently







where m is the total number of regions.
Figure 6: Synthetic datasets DS-1 (lhs) and DS-2 (rhs) representing relatively sparse and dense training data respectively.
In the running example, we first observe that the ACU is much lower than the testing error, which means that the
underlying ML model is a robust one. Since our RAM is largely based on the robustness evidence, its results are close
to ACU, but not exactly the same because of the nonuniform OP, cf. Figure 5-rhs.
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Table 1: Modelling details and results of applying the RAM on five datasets. Time is in seconds per cell.
train/test error r-separation radius ε # of cells ACU E[λ] V[λ] Ub97.5% time
The run. exp. 0.0005/0.0180 0.004013 0.004 250× 250 0.002982 0.004891 0.000004 0.004899 0.04
Synth. DS-1 0.0037/0.0800 0.004392 0.004 250× 250 0.008025 0.008290 0.000014 0.008319 0.03
Synth. DS-2 0.0004/0.0079 0.002001 0.002 500× 500 0.004739 0.005249 0.000002 0.005252 0.04
MNIST 0.0051/0.0235 0.369 0.300 k Fig. 7(b) Fig. 7(a) Fig. 7(a) Fig. 7(a) 0.43
CIFAR10 0.0199/0.0853 0.106 0.100 k Fig. 7(d) Fig. 7(c) Fig. 7(c) Fig. 7(c) 6.74
Remark 5 (ACU is a special case of pmi). When the OP is “flat” (uniformly distributed), ACU and our RAM result
regarding pmi are equal, which can be seen from Eqn. 4 by setting all Opis equally to
1
m .
Moreover, from Figure 5-lhs, we know that the classification boundary is near the middle of the unit square input
space where misclassifications tend to happen (say, a “buggy area”), which is also the high density area on the OP.
Thus, the contribution to unreliability from the “buggy area” is weighted higher by the OP, explaining why our RAM
results are worse than the ACU. In contrast, because of the relatively “flat” OP for the DS-1 (cf. Figure 6-lhs), our
RAM result is very close to the ACU (cf. Remark 5). With more dense data in DS-2, the r-distance is much smaller
and leads to smaller cell radius and more cells. Thanks to the rich data in this case, all three results (testing error,
ACU, and the RAM) are more consistent than in the other two cases. We note that, given the nature of the three
2D-point datasets, ML models trained on them are much more robust than image datasets. This is why all ACUs are
better than test errors, and our RAM finds a middle point representing reliability according to the OP. Later we apply
the RAM on two unrobust ML models trained on image datasets, where the ACUs are worse than the test error; it
confirms our aforementioned observations.
Regarding the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, we first train VAE on them and compress the datasets into the
low dimensional latent spaces of VAE with 8 and 16 dimensions, respectively. We then fit the compressed dataset
with KDE to approximate the OP. Each compressed data-point is now associated with a weight representing its OP.
Consequently, each norm ball in the pixel space that corresponds to the compressed data-point in the latent space
(after the mapping, cf. Remark 4) is also weighted by the OP. Taking the computational cost into account—say only
the astuteness evaluation on a limited number of k norm balls is affordable—we do random sampling, invoke the
estimator for weighted average Eqn.s (14) and (15), and plot our RAM results as functions of k in Figure 7(a) and
7(c). For comparison, we also plot the ACU results17 in Figure 7(b) and 7(d).
In Figure 7, we first observe that both, the ACU results (after converging) of MNIST and CIFAR10, are worse than
their test errors (in Table 1), unveiling again the robustness issues of ML models when dealing with image datasets
(while the ACU of CIFAR10 is even worse, given that CIFAR10 is indeed a generally harder dataset than MNIST).
For MNIST, the mean pmi estimates are much lower than ACU, implying a very “unbalanced” distribution of weights
(i.e. OP). Such unevenly distributed weights are also reflected in both, the oscillation of the variance and the relatively
loose 97.5% confidence upper bound. On the other hand, the OP of CIFAR10 is flatter, resulting in closer estimates of
pmi and ACU (Remark 5). In summary, for real-world image datasets, our RAM may effectively assess the robustness
of the ML model and its generalisability based on the shape of its approximated OP, which is much more informative
than either the test error or ACU alone.
5. Probabilistic Safety Arguments for ML Components
At this lower level of ML components, cf. the SubC7 in Figure 3, we further decompose and organise our safety
arguments in two levels—decomposing sub-functionalities of ML components doing object detection and claiming the
reliability of the classification function. In the following sections, we discuss both of them in details, while focusing
more on the latter.
17As per Remark 5, ACU is a special case of pmi with equal weights. Thus, ACU results in Figure 7 are also obtained by Eqn.s (14) and (15).
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Figure 7: The mean, variance and 97.5% confidence upper bound of pmi and ACU as functions of k sampled norm balls.
5.1. Arguments for Top Claims on Object Detection at the ML Component-Level
In Figure 8, we present an argument template, again in the CAE blocks at the ML component-level. It aims at
breaking down the claim “The object detection is safe enough” LLC1 to a reliability claim stated in the specified
measure. The first argument is over all safety related properties, and presented by a CAE block of substitution. The
list of all properties of interest for the given application can be obtained by utilising the Property Based Requirements
(PBR) approach [49], forming the side-claim LLSC1, which is supported by the sub-case SubC10. The PBR analysis,
recommended in [1] as a method for safety arguments of autonomous systems, is a way to specify requirements as
a set of properties of system objects either in a structured language or formal notations. In this work, we focus on
the main quantitative property—reliability—while other properties like security and interpretability are omitted and
remain an undeveloped sub-case SubC9 in the CAE template.
Starting from LLC2, we then argue over the decomposition by four sub-functionalities of object detection. At the
“birth” of an object in the system’s vision (e.g., the total number of pixels is greater than a threshold), the ML com-
ponent should accurately classify it, localise it (normally measured by the Intersection over Union (IoU) of bounding
boxes) and in a good timing (e.g., no later than some frames after its birth). Once initially detected at its birth time,
the tracking function on that object should be reliable enough to make decision making by other control components
safe. The four sub-functionalities of object detection forms the claims LLC3-LLC5.
To support the reliability of classification at the birth time of the objects LLC3, we concretise the reliability
requirements in terms of specific reliability measures, in our case pmi. The “misclassification” and “per input” in
pmi need to be clearly defined: (i) we only consider safety-related misclassification events; (ii) an input refers to the
image frame capturing the “birth” of an object in the camera’s vision (so that images can be treated as independent
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Figure 8: ML component-level arguments breaking down the claim “The object detection component is safe enough” LLC1 to
reliability claims of the classification function stated in specific reliability measures SubC11.
conforming to the definition of pmi). We are then interested in the claim of a bound on pmi with (1− α) confidence,
where Preq is a required bound derived from higher level safety analysis.
While the reliability of the other three sub-functionalities can be similarly concretised by some quantitative mea-
sures, e.g. IoU for localisation, they remain undeveloped in this article and form important future work.
5.2. Low-Level Arguments for Classification Based on the RAM
In this section, we present SubC11 and show how to support a reliability claim stated in pmi based on our RAM
developed in Section 4—the “backbone” of the probabilistic arguments at this lower level. Essentially, we argue over
the four main steps of our RAM as shown in Figure 9. Note that, depending on the data dimensionality of the specific
application, we may either use the “low-dimensional” version of our RAM, where the whole input space is partitioned
into cells, or apply the “high-dimensional” version, in which norm balls (of relatively spare data) are determined
instead (cf. Remark 4) based on the collected data to form the sample frame (representing the population of all norm
balls partitioning the whole input space). Indeed, the method of exhaustively partitioning cells is also applicable to
high-dimensional data, but it would yield an extremely large number of cells that is not only infeasible to exhaustively
examine them but also quite difficult to index for sampling. That said, for high-dimensional datasets, we determine
norm balls from the data instead, forming a smaller and more practical sampling frame. However, the price paid is
at introducing two more noise factors in the assurance—the bias/error from the construction of the sampling frame
and the relatively low sample rate. The former can be mitigated by conventional ways of checking (and rebuilding if
necessary) the sampling frame, while the latter has been captured and quantified by the variance of the point estimate
(cf. Eqn. (15) and Assumption 7).
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Figure 9: Arguments over the four main steps in the proposed RAM.
Figures 10 to 13 show the arguments based on steps 1 to 4 of our RAM, respectively. While the arguments
presented in CAE are self-explanatory together with the technical details articulated in Section 4, we note that i) all
modelling assumptions are presented as side-claims of arguments that need more application-specific development
and justification; and ii) the development of some claims are omitted for brevity, because they are generic claims and
thus can be referred to other works, e.g. [4], for SubC11-C3.2 and SubC11-C3.3 when we treat the OP estimator as
a common data-driven learning model.
Figure 10: Arguments based on the step 1 of the RAM.
6. A Case Study of AUV Missions
In this section, a case study based on a simulated AUV that performs survey and asset inspection missions is
conducted. We first describe the scenario in which the mission is performed, details of the AUV under test, and
how the simulator is implemented. Then, corresponding to Section 3, we exercise the proposed assurance activities
for this AUV application, i.e., HAZOP, hazards scenarios modelling, FTA, and discussions on deriving the system-
level quantitative safety target for this scenario. Finally, we apply our RAM on the image dataset collected from
a large amount of statistical testing. All source code, simulators, ML models, datasets and experiment results are
publicly available on our project website https://github.com/Solitude-SAMR/master samr with a video demo at https:
//youtu.be/akY8f5sSFpY.
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Figure 11: Arguments based on the step 2 of the RAM.
Figure 12: Arguments based on the step 3 of the RAM.
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Figure 13: Arguments based on the step 4 of the RAM.
6.1. Scenario Design
AUV are increasingly adopted for marine science, offshore energy, and other industrial applications in order to
increase productivity and effectiveness as well as to reduce human risks and offshore operation of crewed surface
support vessels [42]. However, the fact that AUVs frequently operate in close proximity to safety-critical assets (e.g.,
offshore oil rigs and wind turbines) for inspection, repair and maintenance tasks leads to challenges on the assurance
of their reliability and safety, which motivates the choice of AUV as the object of our case study.
6.1.1. Mission Description and Identification of Mission Properties
Based on industrial use cases of autonomous underwater inspection, we define a test scenario for AUVs that
need to operate autonomously and carry out a survey and asset inspection mission, in which an AUV follows several
way-points and terminates with autonomous docking. During the mission, it needs to detect and recognise a set of
underwater objects (such as oil pipelines and wind farm power cables) and inspect assets (i.e., objects) of interest,
while avoiding obstacles and keeping the required safe distances to the assets.
Given the safety/business-critical mission, different stakeholders have their own interests on a specific set of
hazards and safety elements. For instance, asset owners (e.g., wind farm operators) focus more on the safety and
health of the assets that are scheduled to be inspected, whereas inspection service providers tend to have additional
concerns regarding the safety and reliability of their inspection service and vehicles. In contrast, regulators and policy
makers may be more interested in environmental and societal impacts that may arise when a failure unfortunately
happens. By keeping these different safety concerns in mind, we identify a set of desirable mission properties,
whose violation may lead to unsuccessful inspection missions, compromise the integrity of critical assets, or damage
of the vehicle itself.
While numerous high-level mission properties are identified based on our engineering experience, references to
publications (e.g., [30]) and iterations of hazard analysis, we focus on a few that are instructive for the ML classifica-
tion function in this article (cf. the project website for a complete list):
• No miss of key assets: the total number of correctly recognised assets/objects should be equal to the total
number of assets that are required to be inspected during the mission.
• No collision: during the full mission, the AUV should avoid all obstacles perceived without collision.
• Safe distancing: once an asset is detected and recognised, the Euclidean distance between the AUV and the
asset must be kept to be at least the defined minimal safe operating distance.
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• Autonomous docking: safe and reliable docking to the docking cage.
Notably, such an initial set of desirable mission properties forms the starting point of our assurance activities, cf.
Figure 4 and Section 6.2.
6.1.2. The AUV Under Test
Hardware. Although we are only conducting experiments in simulators at this stage, our trained ML model can be
easily deployed to real robots and the experiments are expected to be reproducible in real water tanks. Thus, we
simulate the AUV in our laboratory—a customised BlueROV2, which has 4 vertical and 4 horizontal thrusters for
6 degrees of freedom motion. As shown in Figure 14-lhs, it is equipped with a custom underwater stereo camera
designed for underwater inspection. A Water Linked A50 Doppler Velocity Log (DVL) is installed for velocity
estimation and control. The AUV also carries an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a depth sensor and a Tritech
Micron sonar. The AUV is extended with an on-board Nvidia Jetson Xavier GPU computer and a Raspberry Pi 4
embedded computer. An external PC can also be used for data communication, remote control, mission monitoring,
and data visualisation of the AUV via its tether.
Figure 14: Hardware and software architecture and key modules for autonomous survey and inspection missions.
Software Architecture. With the hardware platform, we develop a software stack for underwater autonomy based on
the Robot Operating System (ROS). The software modules that are relevant to the aforementioned AUV missions are
(cf. Figure 14):
• Sensor drivers. All sensors are connected to on-board computers via cables, and their software drivers are
deployed to capture real-time sensing data.
• Stereo vision and depth estimation. This is to process stereo images by removing its distortion and enhancing
its image quality for inspection. After rectifying stereo images, they are used for estimating depth maps that are
used for 3D mapping and obstacle avoidance.
• Localisation and mapping algorithm. In order to navigate autonomously and carry out a mission, we need
to localise the vehicle and build a map for navigation. We develop a graph optimisation based underwater
simultaneous localisation and mapping system by fusing stereo vision, DVL, and IMU. It also builds a dense
3D reconstruction model of structures for geometric inspection.
• Detection and recognition model. This is one of the core modules for underwater inspection based on ML
models. It is designed to detect and recognise objects of interest in real-time. Based on the properties of
detected objects— in particular the underwater assets to inspect—the AUV makes decisions on visual data
collection and inspection.
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• Obstacle avoidance and path planning. The built 3D map and its depth estimation are used for path planning,
considering obstacles perceived by the stereo vision. Specifically, a local trajectory path and its way-points are
generated in the 3D operating space based on the 3D map built from the localisation and mapping algorithm.
Next the computed way-point is passed to the control driver for trajectory and way-point following.
• Control driver. We have a back seat driver for autonomous operations, enabling the robot to operate as an AUV.
Once the planned path and/or a way-point is received, a proportional–integral–derivative (PID) based controller
is used to drive the thrusters following the path and approaching to the way-point. The controller can also
be replaced by a learning based adaptive controller. While the robot moves in the environment, it continues
perceiving the surrounding scene and processing the data using the previous software modules.
ML Model Doing Object Detection. In this work, the state-of-the-art Yolo-v3 Deep Learning (DL) architecture [55]
is used for object detection. Its computational efficiency and real-time performance are both critical for its application
for underwater robots, as they mostly have limited on-board computing resources and power. The inference of Yolo
can be up to 100 frames per second. Yolo models are also open source and built using the C language and the library
is officially supported by OpenCV, which makes its integration with other AUV systems not covered in this work
straightforward. Most DL-based object detection methods are extensions of a simple classification network. The
object detection network usually generates a set of proposal bounding boxes; they might contain an object of interest
and are then fed to a classification network. The Yolov3 network is similar in operation to, and is based on, the
darknet53 classification network.
The process of training the Yolo networks using the Darknet framework is similar to the training of most ML
models, which includes data collection, model architecture implementation, and training. The framework consists of
configuration files that can be set to match the number of object classes and other network parameters. Examples of
training and testing data are described in Section 6.1.3 for simulated version of the model. The model training can be
summarised by the following steps: i) define the number of object categories; ii) collect sufficient data samples for
each category; iii) split the data into training and validation sets; and iv) use the Darknet software framework to train
the model.
6.1.3. The Simulator
The simulator uses the popular Gazebo robotics simulator in combination with a simulator for underwater dynam-
ics. The scenario models can be created/edited using Blender 3D software. We have designed the Ocean Systems
Lab’s wave tank model (cf. Figure 15-lhs) for the indoor simulated demo, using BlueROV2 within the simulation to
test the scenarios. The wave tank model has the same dimension as our real tank. To ensure that the model does not
Figure 15: A wave-tank for simulated testing and a simulated pool for collecting the training data.
overfit the data, we have designed another scenario with a bigger pool for collecting the training data. The larger size
allows for more distance between multiple objects, allowing both to broaden the set training scenarios and to make
them more realistic. The simulated training environment is presented in Figure 15-rhs.
Our simulator creates configuration files to define an automated path using Cartesian way-points for the vehicle
to follow autonomously, which can be visualised using Rviz. The pink trajectory is the desirable path and the red
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arrows represent the vehicle poses following the path, cf. Figure 16-lhs. There are six simulated objects in the water
tank. They are a pipe, a gas tank, a gas canister, an oil barrel, a floating ball, and the docking cage, as shown in
Figure 16-rhs. The underwater vehicle needs to accurately and timely detect them during the mission. Notably, the
mission is also subject to random noise factors, so that repeated missions will generate different data that is processed
by the learning-enabled components.
Figure 16: Simulated AUV missions following way-points and the six simulated objects.
6.2. Assurance Activities for the AUV
Hazard Analysis via HAZOP. Given the AUV system architecture (cf. Figure 14) and control/data flow among the
nodes, we may conduct a HAZOP analysis that yields a complete version of Table 2. For this work, we only present
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no value ... ... ...
... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 2: Partial HAZOP results, highlighting the cause of misclassification (NB, entries of “...” are intentionally left blank).
Hazard Scenarios Modelling. Inspired by [27], we have develop the hazard scenarios as chains of events that link
the causes to consequences identified by HAZOP. Again, for illustration, a single event-chain is shown in Figure
17, which propagates the event of misclassification on assets via the system architecture to the violation of mission
property of keeping a safe distance to assets. Later, readers will see this event-chain forms one path of a fault tree in
the FTA in Figure 18.
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Figure 17: A single event-chain based on the hazard scenario modelling, linking causes to consequences.
Quantitative FTA. We first construct fault trees for each hazard (as TE) identified by HAZOP, by extending and
combining (via logic gates) the IEs modelled by hazard scenario analysis. Each event-chain yielded by the hazard
scenario analysis then forms one path in a fault tree. For instance, the event-chain of Figure 17 eventually becomes
the path of BE-0-1 → IE-1-1 → IE-2-2 → IE-3-2 → TE in Figure 18. Finally, knowing the probabilities of BEs
and logic gates allows for the calculation of the TE probability. As shown by the second iteration loop in Figure 4,
several rounds of what-if calculations, sensitivity analysis and updates of the components are expected to yield the
most practical solution of BE probabilities that associates with a given tolerable risk of the TE.
Figure 18: A partial fault tree for the TE of loss of a safe distance to assets. NB, the “cloud” notation represents omitted sub-trees.
Deriving Quantitative System Safety Target. Based on the experience of relatively more developed safety-critical
domains of AI, such as self-driving cars and medical devices (cf. Section 3.2 for some examples), we believe that
referring to the average performance of human divers and/or human remote control operators is a promising way of
determining the high-level quantitative safety target for our case of an AUV. It is presumed that, prior to the use of an
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AUV for assets inspection, human divers and remotely controlled robots need to conduct the task regularly. This is
also similar to how the safety targets were developed in the civil aircraft sector where they refer to acceptable historical
accident rates as the benchmark. In our case, referring to the human-divers/operators’ performance as a target for an
AUV’s safety risk can be potentially impeded by the lack of historical/statistical data on such performance. Given the
fact that ML model for AUV is a relatively novel technique and still developing and transforming to its practical uses,
an urgent lesson learnt for all AUV stakeholders (especially manufacturers, operators and end users) from this work
is to collect and summarise such data.
6.3. Reliability Modelling of the AUV’s Classification Function
Details of the Yolo3 model trained in this case study is presented in Table B.3, Appendix B. We adopt the practical
solutions discussed in Section 4.3 to deal with the high dimensionality of the collected operational dataset (256*256*3)
by first training a VAE model and compressing the dataset into a new space with a much lower dimensionality of 8.
While training details of the VAE model are summarised in Table B.4, four sets of examples are shown in Figure
B.20, from which we can see that the reconstructed images are preserving the essential features of the objects (while
blurring the less important background). We then choose a norm ball radius ε = 0.06 according to the r-separation
distance18 and invoke the KDE and robustness estimator [66] for k randomly selected norm balls. Individual estimates
of the k norm balls are then fed into the estimator for weighted average, Eqn.s (14) and (15). For comparison, we also
calculate the ACU by assuming equal weights (i.e., a flat OP) in Eqn.s (14) and (15). Finally, the reliability claims on
pmi and ACU are plotted as functions of k in Figure 19. Interpretation of the results is similar as before for CIFAR10,
where the OP is also relatively flat.
Figure 19: The mean, variance and 97.5% confidence upper bound of AUV’s pmi and ACU as functions of k sampled norm balls.
7. Related Work
Assurance Cases for AI/ML-powered Autonomous Systems. Work on safety arguments and assurance cases for AI/ML
models and autonomous systems has emerged in recent years. Burton et al. [19] draw a broad picture of assuring AI
and identify/categorise the “gap” that arises across the development process. Alves et al. [1] present a comprehensive
discussion on the aspects that need to be considered when developing a safety case for increasingly autonomous sys-
tems that contain ML components. Similarly, in [16], an initial safety case framework is proposed with discussions on
specific challenges for ML, which is later implemented with more details in [15]. A recent work [35] also explicitly
suggests the combination of HAZOP and FTA in safety cases for identifying/mitigating hazards and deriving safety
18Because more than one object may appear in a single image, the label of the “dominating” object (e.g., the object with the largest bounding box
and/or with higher priority) can be used in the calculation of r. For simplicity, we first preprocess the dataset by filtering out images with multiple
labels, and then determine the ε based on an estimated r.
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requirements (and safety contracts) when studying Industry 4.0 systems. In [41], safety arguments that are being
widely used for conventional systems—including conformance to standards, proven in use, field testing, simulation,
and formal proofs—are recapped for autonomous systems with discussions on the potential pitfalls. Both, [48] and
[34], propose utilising continuously updated arguments to monitor the weak points and the effectiveness of their coun-
termeasures, while a similar mechanism is also suggested in our assurance case, e.g., continuously monitor/estimate
key parameters of our RAM—all essentially aligns with the idea of dynamic assurance cases [20, 2].
Although the aforementioned works have inspired this article, our assurance framework is with greater emphasis
on, and thus complements them from, the quantitative aspects, e.g., reasoning for reliability claims stated in bespoke
measures and breaking down system-level safety targets to component-level quantitative requirements. Also exploring
quantitative assurance, Asaadi et al. [3] identifies dedicated assurance measures that are tailored for properties of
aviation systems.
OP-based Software Testing. OP-based software testing, also known as statistical/operational testing [61], is an es-
tablished practice, which is supported by industry standards for conventional systems. There is a huge body of
literature in the traditional software reliability community on OP-based testing and reliability modelling techniques,
e.g., [9, 13, 53, 75]. In contrast to this, OP-based software testing for ML components is still in its infancy: to the best
of our knowledge, there are only two recent works that explicitly consider the OP in testing. Li et al. [44] propose
novel stratified sampling based on ML specific information to improve the testing efficiency. Similarly, Guerriero et
al. [26] develop a test case sampling method that leverages “auxiliary information for misclassification” and provides
unbiased reliability estimators. However, neither of them considers robustness evidence in their assessment like our
RAM does.
At the whole LES level, there are reliability studies based on operational and statistical data, e.g., [37, 74] for
self-driving cars, [30, 73] for AUV, and [56] for agriculture robots doing autonomous weeding. However, knowledge
from low-level ML components is usually ignored. In [75], we improved [37] by providing a Bayesian mechanism to
combine such knowledge, but did not discuss where to obtain the knowledge. In that sense, this article also contains
follow-up work of [75], providing the prior knowledge required based on the OP and robustness evidence.
Given that the OP is essentially a distribution defined over the whole input space, a related topic is the distribution-
aware testing for DL developed recently. For instance, in [7], distribution-guided coverage criteria are developed to
guide the generation of new unseen test cases while identifying the validity of errors in DL system tasks. In [24],
a generative model is utilised to guide the generation of valid test cases. However, their notion of “distribution”
normally refers to realistic perturbations on inputs such as Gaussian noise, blur, haze, contrast variation [76], or even
human imperceptible noise. Thus, it is a different notion compared to the OP that models the end-users’ behaviours.
8. Discussion
8.1. Discussions on the Proposed RAM
In this section, we summarise the model assumptions made in our RAM, and discuss if/how they can be validated
and which new assumptions and compromises in the solutions are needed to cope with real-world applications with
high-dimensional data. Finally, we list the inherent difficulties of assessing ML reliability uncovered by our RAM.
R-Separation and its Estimation. Assumption 1 derives from Remark 3. We concur with [68] and believe that, for
any real-world ML classification application where the inputs are data-points with “physical meanings”, there should
always exist an r-stable ground truth. Such r-stable ground truth varies between applications, and the smaller the r
is, the harder the inherent difficulty of the classification problem becomes. This r is therefore a difficulty indicator
for the given classification problem. Indeed, it is hard to estimate the r (either in the input pixel space nor the latent
feature space)—the best we can do is to estimate it from the existing dataset. One way of solving the problem is to
keep monitoring the r estimates as more labelled data is collected, e.g. during operation, and to redo the cell partition
when the estimated r has changed significantly. Such a dynamic way of estimating r can be supported by the concept
of dynamic assurance cases [2].
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Approximation of the OP from Data. Assumption 2 says that the collected dataset statistically represents the OP,
which may not hold for many practical reasons—e.g., when the future OP is uncertain at the training stage and data is
therefore collected in a balanced way to perform well in all categories of inputs. Although we demonstrate our RAM
under this assumption for simplicity, it can be easily relaxed. Essentially, we try to fit a PDF over the input space
from an “operational dataset” (representing the OP). Data-points in this set can be unlabelled raw data generated from
historical data of previous applications and simulations, which can then be scaled based on domain expert knowledge
(e.g., by DL generative models that we are currently investigating). Obtaining such an operational dataset is an
application-specific engineering problem, and manageable thanks to the fact that it does not require labelled data.
Notably, the OP may also be approximated at runtime based on the data stream of operational data. Efficient KDE for
data streams [54] can be used. If the OP was subject to sudden changes, change-point detectors like [70] should also
be paired with the runtime estimator to robustly approximate the OP. Again, such dynamic way of estimating OP can
also be supported by dynamic assurance cases [2].
Determination of the Ground Truth of a Cell. Assumptions 3 and 4 are essentially on how to determine the ground
truth label for a given cell, which relates to the oracle problem of testing ML software. While this still remains
challenging, we partially solve it by leveraging the r-separation property. Thanks to r, it is easy to determine a cell’s
ground truth when we see that it contains labelled data-points. However, for an empty cell, it is non-trivial. We assume
the overall performance of the ML model is fairly good (e.g., better than a classifier doing random classifications),
thus misclassifications within an empty cell are relatively rare events. We can determine the ground truth label of the
cell by majority voting of predictions. Indeed, it is a strong assumption when there are some “failure regions” in the
input space, within which the ML model performs really badly (even worse than random labelling). In this case, we
need new mechanism to detect such “really bad failure regions” or spend more budget on, for example, asking humans
to do the labelling.
Efficiency of Cell Robustness Evaluation. Although we only applied the two methods of SMC and [66] in our ex-
periments to evaluate the local robustness, we believe that other statistical sampling methods designed for estimating
the probability of rare-events could be used as well. Moreover, the cell robustness estimator in our RAM works in
a “hot-swappable” manner: any new and more efficient estimator can easily be incorporated. Thus, despite being an
important question, how to improve the efficiency of the robustness estimation for cells is beyond the scope of our
RAM.
Conditional OP of a Cell. We assume that the distribution of inputs (the conditional OP) within each cell is uniform
by Assumption 5. Although we conjecture that this is the common case due to the small size of cells (i.e., those very
close/similar inputs within a small region are only subject to noise factors that can be modelled uniformly), the specific
situation may vary; this requires justification in safety cases. For a real-world dataset, the conditional OP might
represent certain distributions of “natural variations” [77], e.g. lighting conditions, that obey certain distributions.
Ideally, the conditional OP of cells should capture the distribution of such natural variations. Recent advance on
measuring the naturalness/realisticness of AEs [29] highly relates to this assumption and may relax it.
Independent λis and Opis. As per Assumption 6, we assume all λis and Opis are independent when “assembling”
their estimates via Eqn. (11) and deriving the variance via Eqn. (12). This assumption is largely for the mathemat-
ical tractability when propagating the confidence in individual estimates at the cell-level to the pmi. Although this
independence assumption is hard to justify in practice, it is not unusual in reliability models that do partition, e.g., in
[53, 50]. We believe that RAMs are still useful under this assumption, while we envisage that Bayesian estimators
leveraging joint priors and conjugacy may relax it.
Uncertainties Raised by Individual OP and Robustness Estimates. This relates to how reliable the chosen OP and
robustness estimators themselves are. Our RAM is flexible and evolvable in the sense that it does not depend on
any specific estimators. New and more reliable estimators can therefore easily be integrated to reduce the estimation
uncertainties. Moreover, such uncertainties raised by estimators are propagated and compounded in our overall RAM
results, cf. Eqn.s (12) and (15). Although we ignore them as per Assumption 7, this is arguably the case when the two
estimators are fairly reliable and the number of samples k is much smaller than the sample frame size n.
27
Inherent Difficulties of Reliability Assessment on ML Software. Finally, based on our RAM and the discussions above,
we summarise the inherent difficulties of assessing ML reliability as the following questions:
• How to accurately learn the OP in a potentially high-dimensional input space with relatively sparse data?
• How to build an accurate test oracle (to determine the ground truth label) by, e.g., leveraging the existing labels
(done by humans) in the training dataset?
• What is the local distribution (i.e. the conditional OP) over a small input region (which is potentially only
subject to subtle natural variations of physical conditions in the environment)?
• How to efficiently evaluate the robustness of a small region, given that AEs are normally rare events? And how
to reduce the risk associated with an AE (e.g., referring to ALARP)?
• How to efficiently sample small regions from a large population (due to the high-dimensionality) of regions to
test the local robustness in an unbiased and uncertainty informed way, given a limited budget?
We provide solutions in our RAM that are practical compromises (cf. Section 4.3), while the questions above are still
challenging. At this stage, we doubt the existence of other RAMs for ML software with weaker assumptions that
achieve the same level of rigorousness as ours, in which sense our RAM advances in this research direction.
8.2. Discussions on the Overall Assurance Case Framework and Low-Level Probabilistic Safety Arguments
With the emphasis on quantitative aspects of assuring LES (and thus complementing existing assurance frame-
works, e.g., [15]), our overall assurance framework and the low-level probabilistic safety arguments together form
an “vertically” end-to-end assurance case, in which a chain of safety/reliability techniques are integrated. However,
the assurance case presented is still incomplete “horizontally”—some sub-cases and (side-)claims are undeveloped.
Because, they are either generic claims that have been studied elsewhere (and omitted for simplicity), e.g. in [15, 4],
or are still quite hard to argue in general and thus require specific expert judgement in a case-by-case manner.
The proposed safety analysis activities—HAZOP, hazard scenarios modelling, FTA, our RAM, and the determi-
nation of the system-level safety targets based on the performance of human/similar-products—are not exclusive in
our assurance framework; rather we concur with [41] that credible safety cases require a heterogeneous approach. A
dangerous pitfall is that those activities are not performed sufficiently because of, say, the analyser’s limited engineer-
ing knowledge/experience and the lack of empirical data. This is, however, not unique to our assurance framework,
but rather generic to any assurance studies.
We only present safety arguments for the classification function of the ML component, based on our new RAM
for ML classifiers, leaving claims for the other three functions—localisation, detection timing, and object tracking—
undeveloped19. The general idea and principles, however, are applicable to the other three functions, too: we may first
define bespoke reliability measures for each (like pmi for classification), and then do probabilistic reliability modelling
based on statistical testing evidence. This forms important future work.
8.3. Discussions on the Simulated AUV Case Study
So far, we have conducted a case study in simulators to validate and demonstrate our proposed methods. While
defending the role of simulation in certification and regulation is beyond the scope of this work, simulation is arguably
necessary for many reasons as long as the simulation satisfies some prerequisites—for example, the fidelity is justi-
fiable, scenario-coverage is sufficiently high, and non-zero real-world testing is conducted to validate the simulation.
That said, we plan to conduct a real-world case study in a physical wave tank, in which the conditions may be ad-
justed to have real-world disturbances, e.g., generating various types of waves in offshore scenarios and changing the
lighting conditions.
19Certainly for real safety cases, we also need to develop claims on “non-ML” parts (e.g., capability of the development team and quality of the
code) which can be addressed by conventional approaches that we omit in this work.
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9. Conclusion and Future Work
This article introduces a RAM designed for ML classifiers, extending its initial version of [71] with more practical
considerations for real-world applications of high-dimensional data and autonomous systems, e.g., the new estimator
Eqn.s (14) and (15), alternative solutions discussed in Section 4.3, and new experiments on image datasets and an
AUV mission. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first ML RAM that explicitly considers both the OP information
and robustness evidence. It has also allowed us to uncover some inherent challenges when assessing ML reliability.
Based on the RAM, we present probabilistic safety arguments for ML components incorporating low-level V&V
evidence. To complete the “big picture”, we also propose an overall assurance framework, in which a set of safety
analysis activities are integrated to identify the whole LES level safety targets and break down them to component-
level reliability requirements of ML functions. Finally, a case study based on simulated AUV is conducted. The case
study is comprehensive in terms of exercising and demonstrating all proposed methods in our assurance framework
and also identifying key challenges with recommendations for ML models of autonomous systems.
An intuitive way of perceiving our RAM, comparing with the usual accuracy testing, is that we enlarge the test
set with more test cases around the “seeds” (original data-points in the test set). We determine the oracle of a new
test case according to its seed’s label and the r-distance. Those enlarged test results form the robustness evidence,
and how much they contribute to the overall reliability is proportional to its OP. Consequently, exposing to more tests
(robustness evaluation) and being more representative of how it will be used (the OP), our RAM is more informative—
and therefore more trustworthy. In line with the gist of our RAM, we believe that the DL reliability should follow the
conceptualised equation of:
DL reliability = generalisability × robustness.
In a nutshell, this equation says that, when assessing the reliability of ML software, we should not only consider how
the DL model generalises to a new data-point (according to the future OP), but also take the local robustness around
that new data-point into account.
Apart from the future work mentioned in the discussion section, we also plan to conduct more real-world case
studies to examine the scalability of our methods. We presume a trained ML model for our assessment purpose. A
natural follow-up question is how to actually improve the reliability when our RAM results indicate that a system is
not good enough. As described in [72], we plan to investigate integrating ML debug testing (e.g. [31]) and retraining
methods [6] with the RAM, to form a closed loop of debugging-improving-assessing. Last but not least, we find the
idea of dynamic assurance cases [2] may have a great potential for addressing some challenges we currently face in
our framework.
Appendix A. KDE Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is a statistical approach to estimate any sampling distribution by random a sampling method. We
sample with replacement from the original data points (X,Y ) to obtain a new bootstrap dataset (Xb, Y b) and train the
KDE on the bootstrap dataset. Assume the bootstrapping process is repeated B times, leading to B bootstrap KDEs,
denoted as Ôp
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Appendix B. Details of the Yolo and VAE Models Trained in the AUV Case Study
We present more details of the Yolo and VAE models trained in the AUV case study respectively in Table B.3 and
B.4, while in Figure B.20 four images reconstructed from the VAE model are shown as examples.
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Table B.3: Average Precision (AP) of YOLOv3 model for object detection.
Class Train Test
AP50 AP75 AP50 AP75
Pipe 0.98343 0.73503 0.97131 0.72532
Floating Ball 0.85765 0.40094 0.90912 0.42536
Gas Canister 0.87230 0.62546 0.87406 0.60331
Gas Tank 0.98930 0.76552 0.99346 0.76824
Oil Barrel 0.84578 0.61437 0.84258 0.57856
Docking Cage 0.88771 0.32021 0.91076 0.33656
mAP 0.90603 0.57692 0.91688 0.57289
Table B.4: Reconstruction Loss and KL Divergence Loss of VAE model
VAE model Train Test
Recon. Loss 0.002601 0.003048
KL Div. Loss 1.732866 1.729756
Figure B.20: Four original images (top row) and the corresponding reconstructed images (bottom row) by the VAE model.
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